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BY DAMIEN KINGSBURY 
Analysis: Aceh’s non-
federation with Indonesia
When the Aceh peace agreement was signed in Helsinki
on August 15, 2005, it ended 28 years of conflict in that
Indonesian territory. The signatories to the agreement were
the Indonesian government and the rebel group in Aceh,
the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, better
known by its initials GAM. For an outcome that employed
the ideas of both federalism and autonomy, the agreement
studiously avoided both these terms. The term “autonomy”
was unacceptable to GAM because it denoted the status
quo, while federalism posed a direct challenge to the
unitary nature of the Indonesian state. 
At certain times in a country’s history, political appearances
are often more important than reality. So what is said in
Indonesia today does not necessarily correspond to what
exists. Hence the Aceh peace agreement described an
autonomous, federated relationship, but refused to call it that. 
The conflict which was ended by the Aceh peace agreement
started in 1976. That was when GAM rose up against the
Indonesian state, re-asserting the pre-Dutch, independent
status of Aceh. After GAM began its military actions, the
Indonesian government and its military responded, leaving
more than 15,000 dead, thousands of homes destroyed and
a population of a little over four million in terror. 
“Special autonomy”
In 2002, following the 32-year reign of President Suharto,
Aceh was nominally granted special autonomy, as well the
other territory of Papua (most of the west half of the island
of New Guinea, across from now-independent Papua New
Guinea) under a program of political reform that
recognized their historical status. 
In the rest of Indonesia, measures aimed at bringing about
certain levels of regional autonomy devolved some political
and economic authority to the sub-provincial district level.
The intent was to alleviate over-centralization and a lack of
responsiveness while ensuring that autonomous districts
remained too small to be independently viable.  
The special autonomy granted to Aceh and Papua differed
in that it devolved authority to the province rather than the
district. This was meant to placate separatist sentiments. In
reality, little of the income from these resource-rich
provinces remained within them, a high level of centralized
25
political control continued and there
was an increase in already high military
activity.
GAM thus rejected the notion of special
autonomy, claiming it to be a sham.
Thus, any peace agreement to be
reached in Helsinki could not include
this word. 
From the Indonesian government
perspective, the term federalism was
equally problematic. Indonesia was
established as a federation in 1949, but
federalism was ended the following
year. Its critics claimed it was unworkable and served as a
front for continuing Dutch colonial interests.
Generally, federalism is held to be an appropriate model for
polities in which there is a relatively high degree of pre-
established local political identity, but increasingly also a
wider political commonality. 
Indonesia spans eight major island groups and some 13,000
inhabited islands, with more than a dozen major languages
and 350 or so minor ones. Its main point of commonality is
its colonial history. The Netherlands — who as a colonial
power ruled Indonesia from 1700 to 1949 — established
federal states there between 1946 and 1949 as a
counterweight to the Republic of Indonesia that Sukarno
and Mohammad Hatta had proclaimed in August 1945 after
the end of the Second World War. In December 1949,
(Dutch) federal Indonesia had 16 partner-states and
autonomous territories. Indonesian nationalists saw this
federal structure as an instrument of Dutch imperialism,
another example of the old imperial principle of “divide and
rule”. Against this background, though Indonesia could
have been an ideal candidate for federalism, the Republic of
Indonesia reconstructed itself as a unitary state in 1950.
From 1950, Indonesia was recast not just as a unitary state
but, in a sense, as a recreation of the thirteenth century
Javanese Majapahit Empire. Indonesian school children still
learn of its imperial glories from their history books. But
there was and remains little room in an empire for a
relationship between equals. 
It is not surprising, then, that no sooner had the Indonesian
government in Jakarta collapsed Indonesia’s federal
structure than South Sulawesi and then Ambon rose in
separatist revolt. The Indonesian military quickly prevailed,
but the rebellions cemented in the minds of the army officer
corps the idea that federalism was a threat to the unity of
the state. Indonesia would have to be held together and a
nation created, they believed, by force if necessary. 
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Aceh’s involvement in a wider Islamic-inspired rebellion
from 1953 and another regionally-based rebellion in 1958
also added to Indonesia’s sense of state insecurity. The
periphery, it seemed, could not be trusted. Following the
defeat of these rebellions, Indonesia shifted from
parliamentary democracy to an executive presidency,
further centralizing political authority.
Federalism vs. a unitary Indonesia
After the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and in light of
what was increasingly seen as the failure of Indonesia’s
national project, a leading anti-Suharto political figure,
Amien Rais, briefly and unsuccessfully flirted with a
proposal to re-establish Indonesia as a federal state. Rais,
the speaker of Indonesia’s upper house of the legislature
from 1998 to 2004, was chair of the National Mandate Party
and the former leader of one of the largest Muslim
organizations in Indonesia. He ran for president in 2004 but
came in fourth, with just 15 per cent of the vote.
However, it was also around this time that East Timor
began to look like it might have its own relationship with
Indonesia recast. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in
1975 and integrated in 1976, both acts in defiance of
international law. Responding to the possibility of East
Timor’s separation, the army initiated both a covert
military campaign against it and stepped up its rhetoric of
asserting that the unity of the state is of capital importance.
The rhetorical term used to assert state unity was Negara
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI), the Unitary State of
the Republic of Indonesia. 
NKRI became a military and nationalist mantra, especially
after East Timor’s separation in October 1999. In Aceh, the
army insisted that public servants not only swear an oath of
allegiance to NKRI, but also be tested on its meaning. The
answer to the perceived threats of political plurality, it
seemed, was to reassert the unitary state. 
Given Indonesia’s delicate democratic transition and the
continuing influence that the army played in politics, no
Indonesian politician would ever say in public that
Indonesia was anything other than a unitary state. During
the Aceh peace talks it was impossible for Indonesian
government negotiators to accept, much less propose, any
political solution that challenged the rhetorical validity of
NKRI. Federalism was an unacceptable term. 
GAM gives up independence for autonomy
In reaching an agreement, GAM gave up its claim for
independence in exchange for a high degree of genuine
autonomy. The Indonesian government agreed in practice
to allow Aceh semi-independence, and hence a functionally
federated status. 
In the heady days following the signing of the Aceh peace
agreement, there was widespread discussion in the
Indonesian media that it could constitute a way forward for
political relations between Jakarta and the rest of the state. 
In particular, a question that quickly arose was whether the
similarly troubled province of Papua could also achieve an
Aceh-like agreement. Further, the question went, if this was
possible, would this not open the way for Indonesia to
become a genuine federation? 
Before this question could be addressed, Indonesia’s
president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono — a former general
who served in East Timor in the 1970s — and some leading
politicians in the Indonesian legislature pushed through the
division of Papua into three provinces. A subsequent
Constitutional Court ruling allowed two of the divisions,
with the third case pending. 
The claimed intention of this move was to better allocate
resources within Papua. However, the move appeared to be
designed to isolate and better control Papuan separatist
sentiment. One of the key objectives of the policy of
dividing Papua into three or more provinces was to prevent
the implementation of the Papua version of Special
Autonomy. The advocates of division feared that such a
move would empower a local elite who they suspected
would use autonomy to push for independence. 
Given this division, Papua’s capacity to negotiate an Aceh-
like agreement now seems remote. 
After a promising earlier start, indigenous Papuans did not
achieve a high degree of internal cohesion. Unifying leaders
have been rare. The charismatic leader, Theys Eluay, was
murdered by army special forces troops in 2001, and more
recent candidates became political exiles and one of them
suffered a serious stroke.
For the rest of Indonesia, reverting to a federal structure
would require the other Indonesian provinces to press for a
new political arrangement, based on concessions to
demands for devolution or separatism. Such claims are
heard in Indonesia, but not with much conviction and
rarely with any force. And the Indonesian army has made it
clear that it will respond harshly to such initiatives.
Could a federal Indonesia emerge?
Given that the Indonesian government is playing a delicate
game of trying to reduce the effective independence of the
military, it is most unlikely to initiate any move that would
bring it into direct confrontation with the armed forces. In
this, it is worth remembering that current President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono is a former army major-general.    
Federalism could be a logical proposition for Indonesia,
given its fragmented geography and cultures, and its
largely separate pre-colonial history. But the forces arrayed
against federalism are substantial and, for the foreseeable
future, probably overwhelming. 
Assuming the intention of the Aceh peace agreement is
manifested in reality, Aceh will have achieved a functional
federated relationship with Jakarta. This has been achieved,
though, by a costly guerilla war waged by the Acehnese
and a willingness to negotiate for something less than
complete independence. Their example could inspire others
to push for local autonomy. 
But the chances of federalism — as opposed to local
autonomy — are slim. Because of a lack of local
commitment, the vehement opposition of the Indonesian
army and the nationalist fervor of opportunist politicians in
Jakarta, such a federation – rhetorical or functional – no
longer appears likely elsewhere in Indonesia. 
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